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_Money and Challenger
Emmergence in
Gubernatorial Primaries
KEDRON BARDWELL, GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY
Compared to congressional elections, gubernatorial races are underrep-
resented in the campaign finance literature. At the same time, the great
diversity of state campaign finance laws enables a comparative analysis of
their impact in gubernatorial races. I use data from 1980 to 2000 to test
hypotheses about challenger emergence, campaign finance laws, and
candidate spending in gubernatorial party primaries. I find that incum-
bents with high job approval ratings and those in party endorsement
states are more likely to be unopposed in the primary. In contested pri-
maries, experienced challengers and those who accept public funding are
better able to match levels of spending by incumbents. The findings shed
light on the dynamics of challenger emergence and the potential for
public funding programs to make elections more competitive.
The role of money in elections is one of the most hotly debated issues in Amer-
ican politics. Most of the attention to campaign finance reform focuses on federal
races. Research on the role of spending in gubernatorial elections is less developed
than the vast literature on congressional races (Epstein and Zemsky 1995; Erick-
son and Palfrey 1998, 2000; Gerber 1998; Green and Krasno 1988, 1990; Jacob-
son 1978, 1980, 1990; Squire 1991). Yet races for governor see more media cov-
erage, higher candidate name recognition, and higher voter turnout than U.S.
Senate races do (Boyd 1989; Squire and Fastnow 1994; Tidmarch, Hyman, and
Sorkin 1984). Recent studies reflect increasing interest in the role of money in
gubernatorial elections (Gross and Goidel 2001; Partin 1999), but there is still the
need and opportunity for systematic research on the financing of these races.'
Due to the difficulty of gathering state data, research on the financing of gubernatorial campaigns
is sparse (Malbin and Gais 1998). One scholar tracks spending in gubernatorial races and makes
the data available to others (Beyle 1986, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1996). One study looks at the 'effects
of spending on the vote for governor (Patterson 1982), but save for a recent study of election-cycle
spending differences in gubernatorial and Senate races (Gross and Goidel 2001), the causes of
spending are less well known.*
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In contrast to federal laws, state campaign finance laws vary widely This
diversity creates fifty laboratories of reform where the effects of legislation can be
measured. Because governors and U.S. Senators share high visibility, competitive
races, and statewide electorates (Squire and Fastnow 1994), a study of guberna-
torial races can clarify the potential impact of federal campaign finance propos-
als. Scholarly arguments over reform are framed in terms of fostering competi-
tion between incumbents and challengers for money and votes (Malbin and Gais
1998: 133-59). As such, primaries deserve specific scrutiny Incumbents'
fundraising advantage is greater in primaries than in general elections. Incum-
bents' war chests send early signals of strength or vulnerability to potential gen-
eral election opponents (Epstein and Zemsky 1995). Finally, incumbents who
deter primary competition are better positioned for success in the general elec-
tion (Kenney and Rice 1984).
This study uses data from two decades of gubernatorial primaries to exam-
ine two issues. First, why are so many incumbent governors unopposed for the
party nomination? Second, when incumbents are opposed, which challengers
are more likely to be financially competitive? How do campaign finance laws
help or hinder challengers in this regard? I propose and test two models repre-
senting the stages of challenger emergence in gubernatorial primaries. One
seeks to explain which incumbents will be unopposed in the primary. I find that
incumbent popularity and party endorsement rules are the best predictors of
uncontested primaries. The other model highlights the determinants of chal-
lengers' share of primary spending. I find that experienced challengers and
those who accept public funding have smaller spending deficits vis-a-vis incum-
bent governors.
WINNOWING THE FIELD: UNCONTESTED PRIMARIES
As elections in America have become increasingly candidate-centered, schol-
ars have focused attention on the strategic behavior of candidates, especially
challengers (Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Jacobson 1989). Prospective chal-
lengers' estimations of their chances of winning help determine if and when qual-
ity challengers will emerge. Unpopular incumbents are seen as vulnerable to
defeat and tend to attract strong challengers. Likewise, strong incumbents can
deter some quality challengers from running (Goldenberg, Traugott, and Baum-
gartner 1986; Green and Krasno 1988). In some cases, prospective primary chal-
lengers are so intimidated by the strength of the incumbent and by internal party
pressure that none of them dares to run. This "scare-off" effect is a major element
of the incumbency advantage in congressional elections (Cox and Katz 1996;
Squire 1989b, 1991).
Like congressional incumbents, state governors have a strong track record of
deterring primary opposition and walking through uncontested party nominations.2
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From 1980 to 2000, approximately 46 percent of incumbent governors were
unopposed in their party's primary, excluding nominees in Virginia and Utah
who were selected by state party convention rather than by direct primary. Why
do some incumbents escape even a token challenge while other incumbents face
strong intraparty challenges? I focus on four factors that should influence the
probability of an uncontested primary: the strength of the incumbent, the avail-
ability of public funding for candidates, party endorsement rules, and incumbent
party dominance.
I measure incumbent strength in two ways. One measure captures the
strength of the incumbent's last general election campaign. The larger an incum-
bent's margin of victory in the last general election, the more likely it is that he
or she will be unopposed for the nomination (Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Green
and Krasno 1988). The governor's job approval rating is another source of
incumbent strength. Popular incumbents can intimidate potential challengers
and dissuade them from running (Epstein and Zemsky 1995). To measure the
popularity of the incumbent, I average the governor's job approval ratings over
the year prior to the primary election.3 This is when most potential primary chal-
lengers make their entry decisions. Popular governors should be more likely to
be unopposed than should unpopular governors (Adams and Squire 1997;
Mondak 1995).
As of the 2000 races, eight states provided public funding to primary candi-
dates. By matching small individual contributions, public funds minimize the
influence of private interests. Public funds entice candidates to accept voluntary
spending limits, given that the Supreme Court ruled mandatory limits unconsti-
tutional in Buckley v. Valeo (1976). Because of incumbents' inherent fundraising
advantages, public funding is of greater proportional benefit to challengers than
to incumbents. It can help mitigate the "catch-22" that most prospective chal-
lengers face: contributors are more likely to give money to viable challengers, but
challengers need to spend money and increase their statewide name recognition
in order to become viable (Kazee 1994; 181). Incumbent governors in states with
public funding should be less likely to be unopposed than governors in states
without it.
Party endorsements are another plausible cause of uncontested primaries.
Endorsements give state parties influence on the nominating process despite
2 In this study, I define uncontested primaries as those where the incumbent is the only candidate
running for the nomination. This definition of uncontested seats is common in the literature
(Kenny and McBurnett 1994; Squire 1989b; Wrighton and Squire 1997).
Job approval data are available online at http://wwwunc.edu/-beyle/jars.html. To control for variance
in state poll questions, the responses are collapsed into percent positive and negative categories.
For example, "excellent" and "good" reflect approval, and "fair" and "poor" represent disapproval.
For more information on this data set, see Beyle 2001.
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direct primaries. The legal right of parties to endorse gubernatorial candidates is
recognized in seven states.4 These endorsements are made by convention months
in advance of the primary What does a nominee gain from an endorsement? A
survey of convention delegates shows that they see legal endorsements as having
three benefits: logistical support from state and local party organizations and
activists, increased financial support, and a boost to candidate name recognition
and momentum (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 106-14). By unifying early sup-
port, endorsements protect incumbents from primary challenges. Recent trends
in competition support this view. From 1980 to 2000, 79 percent of incumbents
in legal endorsement states were unopposed, versus 39 percent of incumbents in
states without legal endorsements.
Incumbent party dominance may also affect challengers' entry decisions. If
challengers are strategic, they will be more likely to enter a primary against an
incumbent when their party's probability of general election success is higher. To
estimate prior party success, I use a measure of the "normal vote" that averages
the vote share of the incumbent's party in the last three races for governor. If the
incumbent's party has a string of victories in gubernatorial general elections, this
should increase the incentive for a challenger to enter the primary field, regard-
less of the popularity of the incumbent (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 120). Put
simply, challengers are long-term strategists when it comes to their political
careers. The better the chance of general election success, the more attractive a
primary challenge will be.
Results
The dependent variable is the status of primaries where incumbents run for
reelection (uncontested = 1, contested = 0). Given this dichotomous dependent
variable, Table 1 presents coefficients from logistic regression (Menard 1995).
Since these coefficients have no direct interpretation, I also estimate the impact
of each variable on the probability that the incumbent will be unopposed.5 The
model performs reasonably well and predicts 68 percent of the cases correctly
While the incumbent's vote share in the last general election has no effect, public
approval is a strong predictor of uncontested primaries. A state governor with a
70 percent job approval rating is more than twice as likely to be unopposed than
This includes Connecticut and Utah, where candidates who win a super-majority of convention
votes win the nomination outright and avoid a direct primary. (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 107).
In Virginia, party conventions have the sole right to select gubernatorial nominees. Because of a
lack of comparability with direct primaries, nominations by party conventions are excluded from
this study
The probability of an uncontested primary is calculated by multiplying selected values of a variable
by its coefficient, holding other independent variables at their means. For more on logit coefficient
interpretation, see Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989 and Menard 1995.
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TABLE 1
PREDICTING UNCONTESTED GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARIES
± One Percent
Variable Coefficient Mean Std. Dev. Probability
Incumbent's Previous General -.003
Election Vote Share (%) (.038)
Governor's Job Approval Rating .058** 57.41 45% 18.41
in Prior Year (%) (.021) 70% 49.03
Availability of Public Funding .473
(Yes = 1) (.593)
Legal Party Endorsement 1.826** .18 No 24.34
(Yes = 1) (.667) Yes 66.64
Normal Vote for Incumbent -.065* 53.16 45% 43.78
Party in General Elections (%) (.036) 60% 21.97
Constant -.706
(2.384)
Number of Cases 98
Aldrich-Nelson R2 .31 5a
Correctly Predicted 68%
Null Percent 54%
aAldrich and Nelson (1984); Hagle and Mitchell (1992)
*p< .05, **p < .01 (one-tailed)
is a governor with 45 percent approval. When deciding to run, potential primary
challengers care more about the incumbent's current popularity than about elec-
tion results that are three years removed.
Contrary to expectations, the availability of public funding has no relation to
whether incumbents are unopposed. The enticement of public campaign funding
does not increase the probability that potential challengers will run for the party
nomination. Meanwhile, state party endorsement rules have the largest substan-
tive effect on the probability that an incumbent will be unopposed. Where formal
party endorsement is recognized by state law, it is a strong deterrent to challengers
who would enter a primary6 All else equal, governors in states with legal party
6 Parties in some states lack legalendorsements but still endorse candidates according to party rules
or tradition (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 106-09). I included a dummy variable for informal
endorsements in an early version of the model, but it was not significant.
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endorsement of primary candidates are nearly three times as likely to be unop-
posed than are governors in states without formal party endorsement.
As for incumbent party strength, incumbents are less likely to avoid a pri-
mary challenge in states where their party's candidates have been highly suc-
cessful in general elections. When the incumbent's party has averaged 45 per-
cent of the vote in the last three general elections, the incumbent is twice as
likely to be unopposed as an incumbent whose party averaged 60 percent of the
vote. Overall, there is a large personal component to challengers' entry decisions
that is not captured by the model. Factors like a candidate's personal ambition,
family situation, and physical health are often hidden from the public eye
(Kazee 1994).
INCUMBENTS, CHALLENGERS,-AND SPENDING COMPETITION
Many incumbents are successful in deterring challenger entry, but more than
half will face primary opposition. Incumbents' advantages include name recog-
nition, the perks of the office, and up-and-running fundraising machines. Chal-
lengers must spend large amounts of money on campaign advertising, travel, and
staff to combat these advantages. One reality of most campaighs is incumbents'
huge financial advantage over challengers (Green and Krasno 1988, 1990; Jacob-
son 1980, 1990; Krasno, Green, and Cowden 1994). On average, incumbent
governors outspend their primary challengers five to one, as compared to a two-
to-one spending advantage for sitting governors in general elections.
There are two sides to the financing of campaigns: fundraising and spend-
ing. A research bias in favor of election outcomes has emphasized the effects of
campaign spending, rather than its underlying causes (Squire 1995). First and
foremost, scholars have seen challenger spending as a means to "buy" votes, lead-
ing to a debate over its efficiency versus incumbent spending (Green and Krasno
1988; Jacobson 1990). Yet the challenger's ability to raise money to spend also
reflects the strength of his or her candidacy By highlighting the factors that help
or hinder challenger spending, this study continues to fill a gap in the literature
(Gross and Goidel 2001). Why are some challengers much more financially com-
petitive than others are? I focus on four influences that drive spending by chal-
lengers: campaign finance laws, challenger quality, race closeness, and the
incumbent's popularity
Intuitively, campaign finance laws should have an effect on candidate
spending, but there is conflicting evidence from state races (Gross and Goidel
2001; Hogan and Hamm 1998; Hogan 1999). And aside from anecdotal evi-
dence, little is known about how these laws systematically advantage incum-
bents or challengers in gubernatorial elections (Malbin and Gais 1998: 135-37).
I focus on individual contribution limits because individuals, as opposed to
state parties and other groups, provide the lion's share of gubernatorial candidate
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funding.7 Should contribution limits matter? In an era of permanent campaigns,
incumbent's' fundraising machines capitalize on networks of wealthy donors;
most primary challengers lack this advantage. While one recent study found no
effect for contribution limits on levels of spending (Gross and Goidel 2001),
expect higher limits on, individual contributions to have a negative effect on
challengers' share of incumbent spending.8
As for the impact of public funding on spending, there is a hitch: not all can-
didates with access to public funding accept it. Rates of participation are gener-
ally high but drop sharply in states where the spending limits are lower than
average spending. Because public funding helps challengers who lack financial
resources but are otherwise strong candidates, challengers who accept it should
be more financially competitive than challengers who do not. Meanwhile, chal-
lengers facing incumbents who accept public funding should garner a greater
share of spending than should challengers facing incumbents who refuse it. This
is because publicly funded incumbents are more likely than challengers to bump
up against spending limits.
Challenger quality should influence the competition for spending between
incumbents and challengers. I use a modified version of Squire's (1992) candi-
date quality scale to measure challenger political experience on a 6-point scale
fromr former governors (5) to novices (0). U.S. House members (4), state office-
holders (4), state legislators (3), local officials (2), and other political positions
(1) receive quality scores based on established political career ladders. Former
officeholders are penalized one point to reflect a decline in statewide visibility
Candidates with celebrity status and statewide name recognition receive a score
of four, the same as statewide officeholders. High-quality challengers should win
a greater share of incumbent spending than low-quality challengers, reflecting
their viability in the eyes of campaign contributors (Biersack, Herrnson, and
Wilcox 1993; Squire 1989).
Most ste 'rvde little to no funding for primary candidates and prefer to be impartial and
gather resources for the eventual nominee's general election run. Different state classification
schemes complicate the analysis of funding sources. I gathered comparable data on funding sources
for ten candidates in three states with unlimited party contributions in 1998. Individuals provided
85 percent of primary funding in these races. PACs and parties combined provide only 7 percent
of funding. I included a control for party limits in an earlier version of the model, but it was not
statistically significant.
8Some states allow unlimited individual contributions; others have varying levels of limits. To meas-
ure the impact of levels of limits, not just their presence or absence, I assign unlimited contribu-
tion states the value of the highest state limit (in New York, $28,000 per candidate per election).
This strategy preserves the most information and reflects the fact that total spending is similar in
unlimited and high-limit states. To show this, I compared mean spending per voter in unlimited
and high-limit states. To make t~he test more conservative, I classified New York and the states with
limits of $5,000 or more as high-limit states. T-tests show that spending in unlimited states is not
significantly higher than in high-limit states.
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Race margin can also influence candidate spending in state races (Gross and
Goidel 2001; Hogan and Hamm 1998). When incumbents run for reelection,
most gubernatorial primaries are not competitive in the traditional sense (i.e.,
margin of victory of less than 10 percent). Incumbents have huge advantages in
fundraising, while challengers struggle just to demonstrate minimal viability
When races tighten, however, contributors are more likely to believe that their
donations to the challenger are potentially decisive. In these races, challenger
spending should increase relative to spending by incumbents, whose fundraising
coffers have less room to grow (Erickson and Palfrey 2000). So challengers in
close races should garner a larger share of spending than challengers in blowouts.
In light of the earlier findings regarding uncontested primaries, I include a
measure of the governor's popularity in the model. As the governor's job approval
rating in the state increases, this should have a negative effect on the challenger's
ability to raise money in quantities needed for a viable campaign. Finally, I
include a counter that represents the year in which the primary election was
held. This control will highlight long-term trends in the financial competitive-
ness of gubernatorial primary challengers from 1980 to 2000.
Results
Table 2 presents results from OLS regression for primary elections between
incumbents and challengers.9 The dependent variable is challenger spending as
a percentage of incumbent spending. Given the time-series cross-sectional data,
I present panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995: 634). The model
explains 77 percent of the variance in challengers' share of spending. Keep in
mind that a challenger's uphill fight for financial support is exacerbated in pri-
maries, when party insider activity and donors' perceptions of candidate viabil-
ity work to the incumbent's advantage. The average primary challenger spends
only 16 percent as much money as the incumbent. Although the substantive
effect of some variables is large, even doubling or tripling mean challenger
spending may not make the primary competitive.
The impact of public funding on challengers' share of spending is the most
prominent finding in Table 2. Challengers who accept public funding receive a
huge financial boost as compared to challengers who reject public funding or
lack access to it.10 Public money makes a run against the incumbent feasible for
potentially strong challengers who lack the experience or organization to raise
enough private money On the other hand, public funding acceptance by
9 Races with self-financed candidates are excluded. A detailed explanation of the primary spending
data used in this analysis is located in the Appendix.
10 A variable measuring levels of spending limits was included in an earlier version of the model, but
it was not significant.
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TABLE 2
EXPLAINING CHALLENGERS' SHARE (%) OF INCUMBENT SPENDING
Variable
Governor's Job Approval Rating in Prior Year (%) -.008
(.175)
Challenger Acceptance of Public Funding (Yes = 1)
62.434**
(15.072)
Incumbent Acceptance of Public Funding (Yes = 1) 6.861
(6.578)
Individual Contribution Limit (thousands of $) .182
(.176)
Challenger Quality 5.591 * *
(1.886)
Race Margin (%)
-.504**
(.102)
Election Year (1980 = 0) .584
(.456)
Constant 29.761 * *
(11.425)
Number of Cases 44
Adjusted R2 .766
*p c.05, **p <. 01 (one-tailed)
Note: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
incumbents has no effect on challengers' share of spending. Challengers might be
expected to benefit from spending limits that cap incumbent expenditures. Why
are primary spending limits ineffective? A plausible reason is that while spend-
ing is much lower in party primaries than in general elections, spending limits
are typically the same for both. Most states set limits on primary spending that
are much higher than average candidate spending.
Political experience also helps increase challengers' share of primary spend-
ing. Each one-point increase in challenger quality rating brings about a six-per-
cent increase in their share of spending. For example, a primary challenger with
state legislative experience garners a 17 percent greater share of spending than a
challenger with no previous political experience. This finding parallels research
on challenger quality and campaign spending in congressional races (Biersack,
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Herrnson, and Wilcox 1993; Krasno, Green, and Cowden 1994; Squire 1989a).
And it suggests that the traits that define viable challengers are mutually rein-
forcing. A challenger with political experience is a better fundraiser, which fuels
campaign spending and promotes the candidate's issue positions and statewide
name recognition.
The closeness of the race also has a positive effect on challengers' share of
incumbent spending." For every 10 percent decline in the race margin (for
example, from 25 percent to 15 percent), challengers' share of incumbent spend-
ing increases by 5 percent. For challengers, close races improve their fundraising
prospects and their ability to match spending by financially advantaged incum-
bents. In light of how rare truly competitive incumbent-challenger primaries are,
challengers in races that are perceived to be close automatically become more
viable. The chance that donors' money could be decisive to the nomination out-
come increases the utility of each dollar contributed to the challenger.
Other variables show no impact on challenger spending.'2 Incumbent pop-
ularity deters primary challengers, but it does not affect challengers' spending
once they enter the race. This finding suggests that the "scare-off' effect has
already weeded out the weakest challengers. Levels of individual contribution
limits do not provide an advantage in campaign spending to incumbents or chal-
lengers. As with spending limits, the effect of contribution limits probably
depends on the relationship of the limit to the average contribution. Even in
states that have relatively low contribution limits ($1,000 for example), in prac-
tice the limit only constrains donors who are able and willing to contribute more
than the law currently allows.
CONCLUSIONS
This study provides insight into the effects of incumbent strength, party
endorsement rules, and campaign finance laws on challenger emergence. Can the
level of competition in gubernatorial primaries be increased? One solution is to
reduce the rate of uncontested races by enabling potentially strong challengers to
The interaction of spending and race margin is likely bi-directional. Spending buys name recog-
nition and closes the gap on the incumbent, which attracts contributions and funds more spend-
ing. If state tracking polls were available, they would allow a dynamic analysis of the ebb and flow
of spending and race closeness (Jacobson 1990: 342). But state poll coverage is sparse, especially
during primaries. Removing race margin from the model does not change the sign or significance
of the other variables, and the model fit remains strong (adjusted R2 = .624). While not central to
this analysis, prior studies show that donors give strategic contributions to candidates in close
races (Hogan and Hamm 1998; Kahn and Kenney 1999).
12 I included a control for challenger party affiliation in an earlier version of the model, but it was
not significant. Evidently both parties' donors are equally stingy when it comes to funding primary
challengers.
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run. I find that incumbent popularity is a deterrent to many primary challengers.
Yet placing a handicap on incumbents may not be desirable, given that public job
approval is a reflection of the incumbents' competence (Mondak 1995). I find
that legal party endorsements help protect many incumbent governors from pri-
mary challenges. Reforms -that reduce internal party barriers to challengers will
help increase primary competition. This requires changing party rules, a task that
is complicated by the enduring strength of many state party organizations (ewell
and Morehouse 2001: 92-98).
Given the effectiveness of challenger spending (Green and Krasno 1988;
Jacobson 1990), reforms that level the financial playing field will increase com-
petition. I find that experienced challengers are better fundraisers than amateurs
are. Yet the ability to attract quality challengers depends on incumbent popular-
ity Many challengers wait for vulnerable incumbents or an open seat (Squire
1989a). I find that public funding programs favor challengers and can help
equalize financial competition, but contribution limits have no effect (Gross and
Goidel 2001). Levels of public funding and spending limits need to be high
enough to entice participation in the system. These findings suggest that reforms
addressing the "catch-22" of challengers' low visibility and insufficient funding
have the potential to make primary races more competitive.
APPENDIX
Historically, data-gathering problems have hindered research on campaign
finance in gubernatorial races (Squire 1992). Some states publish summaries of
spending for primary and general election periods, but because state reporting
dates do not perfectly coincide with these periods, many states are unable to pro-
vide this clean breakdown. Yet it is important to separate primary and general
election spending because these races have different opponents, strategies, con-
stituencies, and levels of competition (Epstein and Zemsky 1995). The primary
election data in this analysis come directly from state campaign finance agencies.
For about one quarter of the cases, mostly in earlier races, I use primary
spending data gathered from state agencies by Beyle and Jensen (2001). To
obtain the remainder of the data, I requested copies of candidate reports for each
reporting period in the primary and then compiled the spending totals to most
accurately reflect the full primary period. This means that some cases reflect a
slightly earlier or later finish to the primary, based on which spending report was
closer to the primary date. In these cases, the average difference between the
actual and imposed end of the primary period is 12.7 days. While not perfect,
these data are the best available on gubernatorial primary spending and cover 82
percent of all primaries from 1980 to 2000.
The data are listed in Table 1A. Missing cases occur for various reasons,
many of them familiar to state politics scholars. Data for some early races are
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- TABLE 1A
PRIMARY ELECTION SPENDING DATA, 1980-2000
Years States
1997-2000 All
1993-1996 All but NV
1989-1992 All but MS
1985-1988 All but MN, NV, ND, NY, RI
1981-1984 All but AR, IL, IN, KS, MD, MT, NV, OK
1980 All
unavailable because a few states temporarily archive files but then destroy them
as space constraints dictate. A few states archive spending reports for only a
sample of all primary candidates. Due to budget and staff shortages in a few
states, academics have to visit archives in person to fill research requests. Gath-
ering data on spending in these cases was cost prohibitive. As more states man-
date the electronic disclosure of spending, these problems will be alleviated.
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